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The Property Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy
John G. Sprankling
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy’s property jurisprudence has largely been neglected by legal
1
scholars, a surprising omission given his pivotal role on the modern Supreme
Court. In this Article, I offer a few reflections on the topic, without attempting to
conduct a comprehensive analysis. Much like an artist painting a landscape in
watercolors, I hope that a few analytical brush strokes will provide a quick—yet
useful—impression of complex legal terrain.
Two challenges immediately appear. First, property issues surface only rarely
in constitutional law, either directly in the context of the Due Process, Takings,
and Intellectual Property Clauses, or indirectly, on occasion, in decisions which
primarily involve other topics, such as the First Amendment or the Fourth
Amendment. Second, and more problematic, it is often difficult to identify
Justice Kennedy’s personal views in such cases because he is almost always in
2
the majority. It is axiomatic that the best way to know a Justice is to read his or
her dissents. But Kennedy rarely dissents, leaving scholars to glean what they
3
can, in particular, from the concurring and majority opinions that he has written.
As a preliminary matter, we can draw four broad conclusions about Justice
Kennedy’s property jurisprudence. First, he is a strong defender of private

 Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. This Article
is based on an address I gave on April 6, 2012, as part of a symposium sponsored by the McGeorge Law Review
in honor of Justice Kennedy’s twenty-fifth year on the Supreme Court, entitled “The Evolution of Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy’s Jurisprudence.”
1. For example, FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009) and HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M.
KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009) both discuss Kennedy’s jurisprudence in depth, but neither one discusses his
approach to property. Indeed, the word “property” does not appear in the index of either book. COLUCCI, supra;
KNOWLES, supra. To date, no book or article has examined Kennedy’s property jurisprudence as a whole. The
only scholarly work that addresses his property jurisprudence in any depth is Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L.
Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’ Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82
WASH. L. REV. 667 (2007), but that article merely discusses some of his Takings Clause decisions as they relate
to environmental protection. See id.
2. See COLUCCI, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that Kennedy has been in the majority more than any other
Justice).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Murchinson, Four Terms of the Kennedy Court: Projecting the Future of
Constitutional Doctrine, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 43 (2009) (observing that Kennedy’s six dissents during “the
2008 Term were the fewest of any Justice”).
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4

property rights, with something of a libertarian bent. Second, he is at the center
of the Court’s property jurisprudence, as in other areas. For example, during his
tenure, the Court has decided fifteen significant cases on regulatory takings, and
Kennedy has been in the majority in fourteen of those decisions—ninety-three
5
percent of the time. Third, he is an incrementalist, generally reluctant to make
6
sweeping changes based on ideology. Finally, he tends to favor fact-intensive
7
tests that require case-by-case adjudication, rather than bright-line standards.
In this Article, I explore three specific aspects of Justice Kennedy’s property
jurisprudence that distinguish him from other current Justices on the Court: (1)
the relationship between property and liberty; (2) the problem of defining
“property”; and (3) the interplay between the Takings Clause and the Due
Process Clause.
II. PROPERTY AND LIBERTY
“We cannot ensure liberty unless we also guarantee the right to own and
8
acquire . . . and keep private property.”
Liberty is the core of Justice Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence. As
Frank Colucci has observed, “individual liberty, not equality, [is] the moral idea
9
he finds central to the Constitution.” Kennedy stressed this point during his
confirmation hearings:
[T]here is a zone of liberty, a zone of protection, a line that is drawn
where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond this line you may
not go. Now the great question in constitutional law is: One, where is

4. See infra Part II. But see Stephen O’Hanlon, Justice Kennedy’s Short-Lived Libertarian Revolution: A
Brief History of Supreme Court Libertarian Ideology, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 29 (2008)
(“Justice Kennedy has not respected the fundamental importance of property rights to the same degree that
libertarians do . . . .”).
5. See infra APPENDIX (listing these decisions).
6. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2615,
2617–18 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting plurality’s effort to “announce a sweeping rule that court
decisions can be takings” in part because “[i]t is not wise, from an institutional standpoint, to reach out and
decide questions that have not been discussed at much length by courts and commentators”).
7. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(supplementing plurality’s deferential “public purpose” test in eminent domain cases with a fact-based test
which would also consider whether “the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to
abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an impermissible
private purpose”).
8. Videotape: Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture—Property and Our Constitutional Tradition: Some
Hobbesian Sticks in the Lockean Bundle (Anthony M. Kennedy 1991) (on file with the Gordon D. Schaber Law
Library, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law) [hereinafter Hefner Lecture].
9. COLUCCI, supra note 1, at 5.
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that line drawn? And, two, what are the principles that you refer to in
10
drawing that line?
Colucci argues that “Kennedy’s ideal of liberty transcends constitutional text and
11
tradition,” an interpretation which helps explain his decisions on such
controversial subjects as abortion, the death penalty, gay rights, and school
12
prayer.
Consistent with this mindset, Kennedy often approaches property rights cases
13
from the perspective of liberty—more so than any other current Justice. Here
we can identify two key themes, each with a long history in property
jurisprudence. First, he views private property as a prerequisite for political
14
liberty, and thus, for democratic self-government. As Thomas Jefferson and
other Founders reasoned, property rights give citizens the economic security
15
necessary for them to exercise independent political judgment. Second,
Kennedy suggests that property is necessary for the full development of the
16
individual, that is, for true personal liberty. This justification for property is
17
traditionally associated with the German philosopher Georg Hegel, but was
more recently espoused by Margaret Jane Radin as the personhood theory of
18
property.
The political liberty theme is reflected in Kennedy’s concurrence in Stop the
19
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
There, Florida landowners complained that the state’s beach restoration project
converted their ocean-front lots to ocean-view lots, and asserted that the Florida
Supreme Court decision upholding this action was a “judicial taking” of their
20
property. Although the United States Supreme Court had never previously held

10. Hearings on the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 86 (1987) (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy, Judge, 9th Cir.) [hereinafter Hearings].
11. COLUCCI, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id. at 1–7.
13. The discussion below interprets Kennedy’s view of property in consequentialist terms, that is, the
concept that we recognize property because it produces socially desirable results. Kennedy would presumably
argue as well that society should recognize property as an end in itself, as a matter of justice.
14. For a discussion of this justification for property, see JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING
PROPERTY LAW 19–20 (3d ed. 2012); D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
36, 37 (2009).
15. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467 (1976).
16. For a discussion of this justification, see SPRANKLING, supra note 14, at 21.
17. See GEORG W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952)
(1821).
18. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
19. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
20. Id. at 2600.
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that judicial action could constitute a taking, four Justices indicated their
21
willingness to adopt this approach —even though the members of the Court
22
unanimously agreed that no taking had occurred on the facts of the case.
Concurring in the result, Kennedy explained: “The Takings Clause is an essential
part of the constitutional structure, for it protects private property from
expropriation without just compensation; and the right to own and hold property
23
is necessary to the exercise and preservation of freedom.”
The personal liberty theme arose in Kennedy’s confirmation hearings when
he expressed concern about government action that causes “the inability of the
person to manifest his or her own personality, the inability of a person to obtain
his or her own self-fulfillment, the inability of a person to reach his or her own
24
potential.” In a later lecture, Kennedy firmly connected this theme to property
rights: “Property . . . is an end through which we can express our personality,
25
engage in creative pursuits, follow our literary tastes, build, plan, and give.”
Writing for the majority in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,
26
Kennedy again relied on the personal liberty theme. He reasoned that even a
convicted drug trafficker was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the federal government could seize his home where the illegal activity
occurred: “[T]he case before us well illustrates an essential principle: Individual
freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this and many
other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who take
27
shelter within it.” Kennedy struck the same theme in Ali v. Federal Bureau of
28
Prisons, where he dissented from the majority’s conclusion that sovereign
immunity prevented an inmate from suing prison officials when personal
property—including religious magazines and a prayer rug—was lost during the

21. Id. at 2602.
22. Id. at 2612.
23. Id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy expressed the same vision in a 1991 lecture, noting
that: “I know of no country that has been able to keep a democratic system without recognizing substantial
rights of private property.” Hefner Lecture, supra note 8.
24. Hearings, supra note 10, at 180. Similarly, Kennedy began his landmark majority opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with these words: “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.” Id. at 562.
25. Hefner Lecture, supra note 8. Of course, as a general matter, government may restrict the scope of
property rights—and thus personal liberty—through regulation designed to serve the public good. Thus, for
example, in writing the majority opinion in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012), Kennedy
implied that an owner would not be permitted to subdivide her property into “parcels of exceedingly small size”
because this would impair the alienability of scarce resources. Id. at 1230–31.
26. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
27. Id. at 61; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 473 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that seizure of an automobile not used to transport contraband violated Due Process Clause). But see
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 139 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that
innocent donee had no greater right to avoid forfeiture under federal drug enforcement laws than did culpable
donor).
28. 552 U.S. 214 (2008).
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inmate’s transfer to a new prison. Finding that the language of the governing
statute was “obscure,” Kennedy wrote that “the Court ought not presume that the
liberties of the person who owns the property would be so lightly dismissed and
disregarded. . . . The seizure of property by an officer raises serious concerns for
30
the liberty of our people. . . .”
One implication of this analysis is obvious: a liberty-based argument might
31
help to secure Kennedy’s vote in a property rights case. For example, in Kelo v.
32
City of New London —one of the Court’s most controversial decisions in recent
decades—Kennedy joined the five-member majority in holding that a city’s
condemnation of property for the purpose of economic redevelopment was a
33
“public use” under the Takings Clause, and hence constitutional. This result was
consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence for over fifty years, which provided that
as long as government took property for a public purpose, the public use
34
requirement was satisfied. Counsel for the property owners attempted to
circumvent this standard by arguing for a “new bright-line rule that economic
35
development does not qualify as a public use,” but the Court found “no
36
principled way” to make this distinction. With the benefit of hindsight, an
argument that a higher standard of review should apply when government
encroaches on personal liberty by taking an owner-occupied home might have
37
had a better chance of attracting Kennedy’s support.
III. DEFINING “PROPERTY”
“[I]f the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow
as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what
38
courts say it is.”
What is “property”? In particular, does property arise only through
government action or can it arise through natural law? As Louise Halper notes,
one of the key questions in regulatory takings law is “what lost value is
compensable on account of a change in the law. Because property value is
29. Id. at 228.
30. Id. at 238, 242–43.
31. See id.
32. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
33. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
34. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
35. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
36. Id.
37. Cf. Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does Three Equal Five? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (2012) (suggesting that the Third
Amendment’s special protection for the home supports heightened scrutiny when determining whether the
government’s seizure of an owner-occupied home is a taking for “public use” under the Fifth Amendment).
38. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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created by law, this question and its answer are circular; there is no
39
uncontroverted account of value that avoids this circularity.” Justice Kennedy
40
has wrestled with this issue to a greater extent than any other current Justice.
Writing in 1651, Thomas Hobbes argued that property rights originated in
the sovereign: It “is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing
41
the rules whereby each man may know what goods he may enjoy . . . .”
Building on the Hobbes approach, Jeremy Bentham famously stated: “Property
and law are born together and die together. Before laws were made, there was no
42
property; take away laws, and property ceases.” Today, most authorities agree
that the American property law system is founded on legal positivism—property
43
rights exist only to the extent that they are recognized by government.
Conversely, natural law theory posits that property rights arise in nature,
44
independent of government. As John Locke reasoned in 1690:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. . . . The Labour of his
Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided,
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with . . . and thereby makes it his
45
Property.
Accordingly, Locke argued that “the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to
46
all Men, Legislators as well as others.” Under this view, government exists to
47
protect property rights that arise through natural law.
When Kennedy joined the Court in 1988, American courts uniformly used
48
the test set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York to
determine if a regulatory taking had occurred. Under this ad hoc approach, the
Court evaluated three factors: (1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with [the

39. Louise A. Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor and Metonymy in the Law of Takings, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 31, 34 (1996); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) (discussing the tension between legal positivism and natural law theory).
40. In contrast, Kennedy would agree that copyright and patent rights arising under the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution are created by government action. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2073 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “the purpose of the patent law is
a utilitarian one”).
41. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 110 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster University 1999) (1651).
42. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Richard Hildred trans., Oceana Publications,
Inc. 1975) (1802).
43. SPRANKLING, supra note 14, at 18.
44. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 285–91 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed.
1698).
45. Id. at 287–88 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
47. See id.
48. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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claimant’s] distinct investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of
49
the governmental action.” One difficulty with this test was its inherent
circularity; if the law determined the claimant’s investment-backed expectations,
then perhaps a government entity could avoid takings liability simply by
50
redefining what constituted “property.”
51
Concurring in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992, Kennedy
52
became the first Justice to diagnose this circularity problem. The majority
opinion adopted the rule that “regulation [which] denies all economically
53
beneficial . . . use of land” was a taking, unless “background principles of the
54
State’s law of property and nuisance” already placed the same limitations on
ownership. For the majority, these background principles were to be found in
case law, through “an objectively reasonable application of relevant
55
precedents.”
Kennedy’s concurrence, however, rested on the traditional Penn Central
56
standard. Even where a regulation deprives property of all value, he explained,
the appropriate test is “whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable,
57
investment-backed expectations.” He then addressed the circularity issue:
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of
course; for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what
courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property
tends to become what courts say it is. Some circularity must be tolerated
in these matters, however, as it is in other spheres. . . . The definition,
moreover, is not circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the
Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that can be
understood as reasonable by all parties involved.
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the
whole of our legal tradition. . . . The State should not be prevented from
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions,
and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their
source. The Takings Clause does not require a static body of state
58
property law. . . .

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 124.
See Halper, supra note 39, at 34.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1032 n.18.
Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1034–35.
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In this passage, Kennedy seems to be forging a rough compromise between
59
natural law and legal positivism. On the one hand, he explains that we should
define “property” based on the “expectations” of owners, a view which suggests
60
that property rights can arise under natural law. Indeed, Kennedy’s concern that
61
“property tends to become what courts say it is” is an implicit rejection of pure
positivism. On the other hand, the protected “expectations” must be “reasonable”
given our legal tradition—as created, among other things, by case law, statutes,
62
and regulations—a view which indirectly reflects positivism. In particular,
Kennedy accepts that, under some circumstances, legislators may adopt new
63
statutes that deprive property of all value without incurring takings liability.
Kennedy returned to the definitional challenge nine years later when writing
64
the majority opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, another regulatory takings
case. There, Palazzolo claimed that the state had “taken” his eighteen acres of
wetlands by adopting a wetlands preservation statute that allowed him to build
65
only one home on the land, lowering its value by ninety-four percent. Part of the
state’s defense was that Palazzolo acquired title only after the statute was
enacted, so he could not have a “reasonable” expectation of using the land in
66
violation of that statute. But Kennedy rejected this approach:
The theory [that no taking occurred] seems to run on these lines:
Property rights are created by the State. . . . So, the argument goes, by
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights . . .
and subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all,
they purchased or took title with notice of the limitation.
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle. . . . Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning
ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because
it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are

59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 1034.
62. See id. at 1034–35. This portion of Kennedy’s analysis partially echoes the Court’s approach to
constitutional property in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972): “Property interests, of course, are
not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Id.
63. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
65. Id. at 615–16.
66. Id. The case was more complex than this summary suggests. Before the statute was adopted,
Palazzolo was the sole shareholder in the corporation that owned the property. Id. at 613. After the statute was
enacted, the corporation failed to pay its state income taxes; its charter was revoked; “and title to the property
passed, by operation of state law, to [Palazzolo] as the corporation’s sole shareholder.” Id. at 614. Thus, an
argument can be made that the notice defense was irrelevant because Palazzolo acquired his beneficial interest
in the land before the statute was enacted. See id.
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unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or
67
title.
Scholars agree that Kennedy’s reference to the “Lockean bundle” reflects the
68
natural law theory of property. Thus, at least to some extent, he seems to agree
that property rights can arise independently of government action—as his Lucas
69
concurrence suggests. Yet Kennedy does not repudiate legal positivism in
70
Palazzolo. His point is that the state may not impose “so potent” a limitation on
71
Lockean property rights. This language implies that some governmental
limitations on property—that is, “less potent” Hobbesian sticks—are permissible,
just as he acknowledged in Lucas.
Kennedy deserves credit for both highlighting the circularity problem and
attempting to resolve it by reconciling natural law theory with legal positivism.
Yet this effort remains a work in progress. As Kennedy observed: “[T]he Court
must . . . continue to see if it can discover some neutral, stable, extrinsic
72
definition for property of the Lockean kind.”
IV. TAKINGS CLAUSE VERSUS DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
“[W]e should proceed first to general due process principles, reserving
takings analysis for cases where the governmental action is otherwise
73
permissible.”
A third distinctive feature of Justice Kennedy’s property jurisprudence is his
attempt to shift the analytical framework for deciding certain disputes from the
74
75
Takings Clause to the Due Process Clause. In this regard, he has acted as a
brake on the efforts of a more conservative plurality to expand the reach of the
Takings Clause, as exemplified by his concurring opinions in Eastern

67. Id. at 626–27.
68. See, e.g., Susan Ayres, The Rhetoric of Takings Cases: It’s Mine v. Let’s Share, 5 NEV. L.J. 615, 635
(2005) (“This metaphor somewhat cryptically expresses [Kennedy’s] natural law view of . . . property rights.”);
Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV.
345, 349 (2006) (explaining that Kennedy’s majority opinion “rejected a particularly stark assertion of legal
positivism”).
69. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032–36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. See id.
71. Compare id., with Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626–27.
72. Hefner Lecture, supra note 8.
73. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 546 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of
law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
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76

77

Enterprises v. Apfel and, more recently, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
78
Kennedy is the foremost exponent of this view on the current Court.
One of the rationales that Kennedy offers for the substantive due process
approach is prudential. Scholars generally agree that the Court’s takings
79
jurisprudence is incoherent. As John Fee summarizes: “If there is a consensus
80
today about regulatory takings law, it is that it is highly muddled.” Accordingly,
Kennedy is reluctant to extend the reach of the Takings Clause.
81
For example, Eastern Enterprises involved a federal statute that created a
mechanism to fund health care benefits for retired coal miners by assigning
82
liability to their former employers. This law imposed retroactive liability on
Eastern Enterprises, which had sold its mining business many years before the
83
84
statute was adopted. The plurality held that the statute was a regulatory taking.
Kennedy concurred in the result, but criticized the plurality’s rationale, arguing
85
that the case should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
Kennedy reasoned that a “constant limitation” in the Court’s past regulatory
86
takings cases was that “a specific property right or interest has been at stake.”
Yet the statute at issue did “not operate upon or alter an identified property
interest;” rather, it “simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment
87
of benefits.”

76. Id. at 539.
77. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
78. Thus, Benjamin Barros observes: “Justice Kennedy is unique among the current Justices in that he is
both sympathetic to the use of substantive due process in individual liberty contexts and sympathetic in many
cases to the protection of economic rights. Consistent with both positions, Justice Kennedy has advocated for an
increased role for substantive due process in various takings contexts . . . .” D. Benjamin Barros, The
Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 937 (2011).
79. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 68, at 615 (noting the “incoherence and inconsistency” of takings
jurisprudence); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 561, 561–63 (1984) (describing takings jurisprudence as “a muddle”).
80. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2003).
81. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
82. Id. at 514.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 529–37.
85. Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting). The four dissenters in Eastern Enterprises
agreed with Kennedy that the Takings Clause did not apply, but that substantive due process analysis would be
appropriate. Id. at 554–58. Lower courts have encountered difficulty in attempting to discern whether the
plurality opinion or Kennedy’s concurrence is controlling. See, e.g., Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d
1046, 1054 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing other cases addressing the issue, but concluding that: “Our independent
evaluation of the case law leads us to agree with Justice Kennedy that the takings analysis is not an appropriate
analysis for the constitutional evaluation of an obligation imposed by Congress merely to pay money.”).
86. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. Id. at 540.
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Kennedy argued that extending the takings doctrine to this new context was
unwise:
The difficulties in determining whether there is a taking . . . even where a
property right or interest is identified ought to counsel against extending
the regulatory takings doctrine to cases lacking this specificity. . . . The
plurality opinion would throw one of the most difficult and litigated
areas of the law into confusion, subjecting States and municipalities to
88
the potential of new and unforeseen claims in vast amounts.
Twelve years after Eastern Enterprises, Kennedy expressed similar concerns
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., where the plurality indicated a
89
willingness to expand the regulatory takings doctrine to judicial action. He first
cited his Eastern Enterprises concurrence for the proposition that regulatory
90
takings cases are “among the most litigated and perplexing in current law.” He
then examined three specific prudential concerns: (1) the plurality approach
91
“might give more power to the courts, not less”; (2) as a practical matter, “it
may be unclear in certain cases how a party should properly raise a judicial
92
takings claim”; and (3) “it is unclear what remedy a reviewing court could enter
93
after finding a judicial taking.” In conclusion, he observed that it “is not wise,
from an institutional standpoint, to reach out and discuss questions that have not
94
been discussed at much length by courts and commentators.”
The second rationale that Kennedy offers for his approach is based on the
structure of the Constitution, turning on whether the particular governmental
95
action is permissible or impermissible. His thesis is that substantive due process
is the principal standard for deciding whether a particular governmental action is
96
permissible. Thus, because the Takings Clause implicitly recognizes the ability
of the “political branches—the legislature and the executive—” to take private
property, it should not be utilized unless the government action is first found to
97
be permissible under the Due Process Clause.

88. Id. at 542.
89. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
Interestingly, about one-fourth of the plurality opinion is a response to the points raised by Kennedy’s
concurrence. Id. at 2604–08.
90. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting)).
91. Id. at 2615.
92. Id. at 2616.
93. Id. at 2617.
94. Id. at 2617–18.
95. Id. at 2614.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Accordingly, in his Eastern Enterprises concurrence, Kennedy explained that
the Takings Clause “operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the
98
government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge,” presuming that
the government action is constitutional. Because the constitutionality of the
statute turned on “the legitimacy of Congress’ judgment rather than on the
availability of compensation, . . . the more appropriate constitutional analysis
arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings
99
Clause.” He concluded that the Court “should proceed first to general due
process principles, reserving takings analysis for cases where the governmental
100
action is otherwise permissible.”
Seven years later, a unanimous Court seemed to adopt this approach in
101
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., holding that a challenge to a Hawaii statute
limiting the rents that could be charged to service-station lessees should be
102
analyzed under the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause. The Court
emphasized that the Takings Clause “requires compensation ‘in the event of
103
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.’” In contrast, “if a
government action is found to be impermissible—for instance, because it . . . is
so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry. No amount
104
of compensation can authorize such action.”
Kennedy utilized a similar structural argument in his Stop the Beach
105
Renourishment, Inc. concurrence. He first noted that the Takings Clause
106
“implicitly recognizes a governmental power” to take private property, and that
the legislative and executive branches were given substantial discretion to
107
determine when property should be taken. Potential abuses of this power were
constrained by political accountability: these “branches are accountable in their
108
political capacity for the proper discharge of this obligation.” In contrast, courts
do not “have the power to eliminate established property rights by judicial
109
decision.” Accordingly, quoting his Eastern Enterprises concurrence, Kennedy
reasoned that where judicial action is concerned, “the more appropriate

98. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 546.
101. 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Robert G. Dreher, Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due
Process from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006) (noting that Lingle “brings a
remarkable coherence to the Court’s confused regulatory takings doctrine”).
102. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543–45.
103. Id. at 543 (emphasis in original) (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)).
104. Id. at 543.
105. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
106. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2613.
109. Id. at 2614.
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constitutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather than
110
under the Takings Clause.”
Writing for the Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. plurality, Justice Scalia
responded to Kennedy’s approach, in part, by asserting that substantive due
process would provide insufficient protection for property rights because “it
111
never means anything precise.” But it seems probable that Kennedy would
apply a more rigorous standard of review in property cases than the traditional
112
rational basis test. As Timothy Mulvaney observes, evidence of this approach
can be found in Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence, where he describes the standard of
113
review he espoused in Eastern Enterprises as a form of “heightened scrutiny.”
V. CONCLUSION
For Justice Kennedy, the protection of private property is a core
constitutional value, inextricably intertwined with personal liberty. At the same
time, he recognizes that the scope of property rights cannot be frozen in time, but
114
rather must continue to evolve in response to “changing conditions.” This
concept is central to our “common-law tradition that allows for incremental
115
modifications to property law.”
But how can the Constitution safeguard “property” if the meaning of
“property” changes over time? This is the most difficult question in modern
property law. More than any other current Justice, Kennedy understands the
conundrum. He does not offer an easy solution, but perhaps he provides us with
an agenda for future action. First, work toward developing a “neutral” and
116
“extrinsic” definition of property. Second, resist the rapid expansion of the

110. Id. at 2614–15. A number of commentators have briefly mentioned Kennedy’s focus on using
substantive due process instead of a takings analysis. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 80, at 1004 (noting that “[o]ur
regulatory takings doctrine today functions more like a substantive due process right”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause,
80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 746 (2002) (stating that Kennedy’s “demarcation of the line between takings claims and
substantive due process claims makes a great deal of sense”); Merrill, supra note 39, at 998 (observing that
Kennedy’s approach “offers a potentially useful line of division between takings claims and substantive due
process claims”); Elizabeth G. Wydra, Constitutional Problems in Judicial Takings Doctrine and the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 125 (2011) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause provides an appropriate avenue for redress and a new “judicial takings” doctrine is
unnecessary.”). For a more detailed examination of Kennedy’s approach, see Barros, supra note 78, at 936–40
(discussing Kennedy’s concurrence in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.).
111. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2608.
112. Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 255 n.40
(2011).
113. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 546 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Court’s “muddled” Takings Clause jurisprudence, and instead, channel property
117
disputes toward resolution under the Due Process Clause.

117. See supra notes 85–100 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Year
Case Name
2010 Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.
2005 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.
2005 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
and County of San Francisco
2002 Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash.
2002 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency
2001 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
1999 City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd.
1998 E. Enters. v. Apfel

Citation
130 S. Ct.
2592

Kennedy’s Role
Wrote concurring
opinion

544 U.S. 528
545 U.S. 323

Wrote concurring
opinion
Joined majority opinion

538 U.S. 216

Wrote dissent

535 U.S. 302

Joined majority opinion

533 U.S. 606
526 U.S. 687

Wrote majority opinion
Wrote majority opinion

524 U.S. 498

1998

524 U.S. 156

Wrote opinion
concurring in result, but
dissenting in part
Joined majority opinion

520 U.S. 725

Joined majority opinion

512 U.S. 375
505 U.S. 1003

Joined majority opinion
Wrote concurring
opinion
Joined majority opinion
Joined concurring
opinion
Joined majority opinion

1997
1994
1992
1992
1990
1989

Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found.
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency
Dolan v. City of Tigard
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council
Yee v. City of Escondido
Preseault v. Interstate
Commerce Comm’n
Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch

503 U.S. 519
494 U.S. 1
488 U.S. 299
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